The series Occasional Papers presents studies and documents on issues pertaining to the institutional tasks of the Bank of Italy and the Eurosystem. The
Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 erupted after a long expansionary cycle in advanced economies, characterized by rapid credit growth and in some countries by bubbles in asset and real estate markets. In Italy the sustained growth in bank lending reflected primarily the transformation of the banking industry following the reforms of the 1990s and the decline in spreads due to the creation of the euro. The ratio of bank credit to GDP increased from 40 per cent to 55 per cent between 2000 and 2007. In the same period the aggregate leverage ratio of nonfinancial corporations, defined as the ratio between financial debts and the sum of financial debts and equity at market value, went up from less than 35 per cent to about 42 per cent (Fig.1 ). (1) The data refer to the non-financial corporations sector. -(2) Left-hand scale. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of financial debt to the sum of financial debt and shareholders' equity at market prices. -(3) Right-hand scale.
In the second half of 2008, after the default of Lehman Brothers, the global recession was transmitted to the Italian economy. A weak recovery in 2010 was interrupted by the sovereign debt crisis, which triggered a second recession starting in the third quarter of 2011. As shown in Figure 2 , the cyclical conditions had a severe impact on the solvency of nonfinancial firms and on the quality of bank loan portfolios, with the rate of newly defaulting loans climbing to historically high levels.
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From a macroprudential policy perspective, an important question that arises is to what extent the financial structure of firms increases their fragility to shocks. We address this question by investigating the role of leverage in a reduced form statistical model of the probability of default. The model is estimated using a very large sample of nonfinancial firms that borrow from banks. Prior evidence shows that leverage increases the probability of default during an economic downturn (Carling et al., 2007; Loffler and Maurer, 2011; Bonfim, 2009; Molina, 2005) ; leverage is also one of the key variables in the estimation of credit scores. Our analysis contributes to this literature by showing not only the direct effect of leverage on default but also how leverage interacts with economic stress. In particular, we study if leverage implied a differential impact of the adverse shock to firm sales on the probability of firm insolvency and quantify these effects using a very large sample of nonfinancial firms, mostly medium and small by international standard.
A second contribution is that we use a definition of insolvency based on credit data from the Italian Credit register. We link information on firms' balance sheets from the Firm Register with information on the status of a borrower in terms of repayment of outstanding loans. In essence, in the CR a firm is considered defaulted if it is unable to repay its bank debts. The default status is based on a combination of different conditions, including default on one or more loans 7 and materiality of the defaulted exposure with respect to the entire exposure of the borrower to the banking system. Thanks to this definition we can include a large number of small firms that do not issue bonds, for which data on defaults are not available from market sources.
Our analysis shows that the drop in sales is the variable that better explains default during the recession. Nevertheless, the financial conditions of the firms at the onset of the first recession, particularly their leverage, had a substantial impact on the default probability. The effect of leverage is twofold. Not only more levered firms have higher default rates on average, but also the sensitivity of the probability of default to a given shock is greater. The effect is sizable as a drop in sales of 10 percentage points raised the default probability by about 6 percentage points for firms that in 2008 were in the top quartile of leverage; the same shock raised the default probability by about 1.7 percentage points for firms in the lowest quartile of leverage.
Data
The first source of our data is the universe of Italian limited liability companies reported in the database Cerved. The sample of nonfinancial firms with information on financial debts for 2007 or 2008 are matched with the records of borrowers in the Central credit register (CR) in 2008. The CR reports, for each Italian credit institution (banks and specialized financial companies), all loans and guarantees to resident borrowers above a given threshold (75,000 euros before 2009 and 30,000 thereafter). Outstanding loans can be performing, past-due, restructured, substandard or bad. There is no threshold for reporting bad loans. A loan becomes bad if the lender deems the borrower irreversibly unable to repay its debt after having assessed his/her overall financial conditions. A late payment is not sufficient to be considered defaulted.
The CR also constructs several indicators of the status of borrowers, defined with reference to all the loans they receive from the entire system of reporting intermediaries. A client can be performing, nonperforming or defaulted ("in sofferenza" in Italian). In our analysis clients default if they enter the CR status of defaulted as a result of having bad loans above a given share of total outstanding credit (see the Data Appendix for the details).
An important caveat of our analysis is that we are focusing on default on bank loans and we are not considering the performance of firms that default on market debt. Nonetheless, financial accounts data show that in Italy bank debt is almost two thirds of firms' financial debt and only very large firms resort to bond issuances (Bank of Italy, 2014) . Therefore, our analysis is relevant for assessing the determinants of default for a substantial share of the economy. Furthermore, our notion of default is more general than bankruptcy because the opening of a formal 8 bankruptcy procedure is a sufficient but not necessary condition for entering the CR default status.
We dropped from the initial cross-section all firms that are considered defaulted already in 2008. The matched sample consists of around 200,000 firms that are followed over time until the end of 2012. Following the sample over time, we observe that the flow of firms that are newly recorded as defaulting steadily increased, from 2.8 percent in 2009 to 4.9 in 2012 (Table 1) , consistent with the aggregate series plotted in Figure 2 . The incidence of default is higher in the construction sector.
We divided the firms into two subsamples: those that did (D) and those that did not default (ND). Those that became nonperforming (substandard, restructured or past-due) but did not become insolvent by 2012 are keep among the ND since they can still revert to performing status, although it is unlikely. As discussed below, aggregating them with the D firms did not change the results of the analysis. In Table 2 we explored the incidence of defaults breaking the sample into the quartiles of 2008 leverage and average sales growth during [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . The distribution of firms by sales growth is based on the mean of the last two available years for each firm. More than half of the firms had negative sales growth as the median of the distribution is -1.4 per cent. The worst performing quartile of firms had a contraction in sales of at least 13.9 per cent on an annual basis. The best quartile had positive growth greater or equal to 9,7 per cent.
As shown in Figure 5 , Panel A, the default rate is more than quadruple for firms in the bottom quartile of sales growth (8 per cent) with respect to the other companies (1.7 per cent). It also increases monotonically with initial leverage. The joint distribution of leverage and change in sales is shown in Panel B. Among firms with the highest drop in sales, those in the bottom quartile of leverage (less than 47 per cent) have an average default rate of 3.8 per cent, about a third of the 10.8 percent rate of firms in the top quartile (leverage greater than 90 percent; see also Table 2 ). Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for a number of economic and financial variables for the D and ND firms (weighted averages). We recall that balance sheet data are usually unavailable for firms once they default so as firms become insolvent they tend to exit the sample. Overall, the firms in our sample are small by international standards. Median total assets are similar in the two subsamples while mean total assets of the D firms are almost half (5.2 million euros) than those of the ND firms (10.3 million). The reason of this discrepancy is that the size distribution of the D firms is skewed, with a small number of very large corporations that have very low default rates.
In the years 2003-2007 the D firms are less profitable both based on Gross Operating Profits/Total Assets and EBIT/Total Assets. At the aggregate level, their ROE is negative, whereas it is positive for the ND firms. The data on the financial structure of the two types of companies reveal substantial differences in addition to the wide differential in leverage shown in Figure 4 . While the ratio of financial debt to sales is very similar, the D firms resort to a larger extent to bank debt than the ND firms; they also have a greater share of short term debt and are less liquid.
This evidence partly reflects the industry composition since the D firms have a higher share of companies in the construction sector but the key differences remain even when repeating the analysis by sector (manufacturing, services, construction, other).
Variables and Statistical Model
We estimated a series of logistic statistical models of the probability that a firm defaults as a function of demographic and balance sheet variables. Given the limited number of years, we study occurrences of default by 2012, i.e. we consider the probability that a firm defaults at any We preferred a measure of operating profits because it is not influenced by interest payments. Liquidity is included because firms with more cash and liquid assets are better equipped to repay their debts when they face an adverse profitability shock. Finally, bank debt is included because for a large number of firms financial debts include some loans from owners. There are tax incentives for the owners to lend to the limited liability company because the interests that the firm pays are tax deductible. We do not expect these loans to play a role in triggering default.
We also include log of total assets (LOGASSETS) and its square to control for size, a set of dummy variables for industries, 4 dummies for the region in which the firm has its headquarters (North-West, North East, Center, South), and a control for the age of the firm in 2008. The variable enters the regression either as a set of dummy variables for age groups (1-5, 6-15, 16-25, >25 years) or as the log of years since the firm was first recorded in the Firm Register.
We computed a measure of the average yearly change in sales before the crisis (SALES-DROP 2006-08) to account for the fact that firms might have entered the recession already in bad shape. The variable proxies for differences in how their performance was evolving before the macroeconomic shock.
Finally, our measure of the firm specific shock during the recession period is the change in sales between 2009 and 2012. We computed the average of annual changes over the years for which the information is available (SALESDROP 2009-12) . To facilitate the interpretation of coefficients we use the transformation (-1)*(change in sales) in the regressions. The effect on the default probability should therefore be positive.
Some studies found that macroeconomic conditions improve significantly the predictive power of statistical default models (e.g. Carling et al., 2007) but they cannot be included in cross-section models. Including the change in sales in our regression is an indirect way to incorporate the macroeconomic shock. The intuition is that the main channel through which the recession affected firms was a drop in demand, both domestic and foreign, and that firms were affected differently depending on the composition of their clients, an unobserved factor. We preferred the change in sales to the change in profits because sales are less influenced by financing conditions of firms and the levels of interest rates charged by banks.
Data on the change in sales during the crisis are available only for a smaller sample of firms, about 105,000. Descriptive statistics for this sample are reported in Table 4 We compared means for the larger dataset (Full sample) and the estimation sample to assess possible differences due to selection (Table a5 ). The geographic and industry distribution is similar but the firms in the estimation sample are larger, have a lower leverage (60 versus 65 per cent) and are more profitable. Nevertheless, they are not stronger along all dimensions since they are less liquid and have a higher share of bank debt. Overall, the firms in the subsample have a lower default frequency, 6.1 per cent versus 10.6 per cent in the larger dataset, suggesting that most of the selection depends on missing balance sheet data due to insolvency. Some robustness tests will be discussed in Section 5 below. Table 5 reports the results of the first set of regressions. We show marginal effects computed as averages of predicted marginal effects from the model. We study the contribution of each financial variable by estimating separate regressions with the set of demographic controls (size, region, age and industry dummies) and one balance sheet variable at a time. In the last specification of the table we include them all.
Results
The results show that leverage has a positive, monotonically increasing effect on the probability of default (column B) as expected; the coefficient of the dummy of the top quartile of lev-13 erage (greater than 84.3 per cent) indicates that the estimated default probability is about 10 percentage points higher than the one of firms in the bottom quartile (less than 38.8 per cent), the excluded category.
The coefficient of pre-crisis sales drop is statistically significant and has the expected positive sign, but the economic effect is not very large. Firms in the bottom quartile of sales (yearly sales drop greater than 4 per cent) have a 3.5 percent higher probability of default with respect to those in the top quartile (yearly sales growth above 14 per cent). The effect is not monotonic.
The other financial covariates are statistically significant at the standard levels and have the expected signs. The probability of default declines as operating profitability and liquidity go up.
It is higher when firms have a substantial share of bank debt, as expected, but there is not much difference in the coefficients as the share of bank debt increases above the median (in the tables we collapsed the 3 rd and 4 th quartiles for the sake of brevity). We also find that firm age is significant and has a negative coefficient indicating that younger firms tend to be riskier, consistent with the evidence in the literature.
So far we related the probability of default to variables that were pre-determined with respect to the shock that hit the firms during the recession. Although firm size, industry and region account for some of the heterogeneity in the impact that the recessions had on firms, the yearly change in sales 2009-2012 should improve the fit of the model because it is a firm-specific shock. The implicit assumption is that the change in sales was not the result of an anticipated increase in the probability of default by clients.
Not surprisingly, the estimated coefficient of the full model specification (column G) shows that the drop in sales during the recession is much more relevant in terms of both explanatory power and economic significance than the change of sales in the three years before the recession. The Pseudo R square almost doubles when we include this variable.
The improvement in the explanatory power of the model due to the addition of SALES- 1 The sensitivity rate, the false positive rate and the share of correctly predicted depend on the value of the threshold that is used to get the predicted values. We opted for a conservative choice of the threshold, approximated by the sample frequency of positives (see Hoetker, 2004) . The use of alternative thresholds does not change the ranking of the models in terms of accuracy.
14 per cent;, the sensitivity increases from 72 to 76 per cent, and the false positive declines from 31 to 20.
Adding SALESDROP 2009-12 does not change the economic and statistical significance of leverage in explaining default. The difference in the default probability between firms in the top quartile of leverage and those in the bottom one is about 7 percentage points, almost the same as the one estimated without controlling for the contemporaneous change in sales. The two variables have independent effects on the probability of insolvency.
We then estimated the model using continuous variables rather than quartiles of leverage and sales (Table 6 ). All the results hold. The coefficient of leverage indicates that increasing leverage by 10 percentage points (around one third of the standard deviation) the probability of default increases by 0.7 percentage points, a sizable effect since the frequency of default in the sample is about 6 per cent. The coefficient of the drop in sales before the crisis is significant and positive but the economic effect is small: a 10 percentage point drop in sales before the crisis (the average change of sales in 2006-2008 is almost 7 per cent for our sample) raises only modestly the probability of default in subsequent years (0.1 percentage points). As in the previous model, adding the drop of sales during the crisis among the set of covariate improves the explanatory power of the model (column G, Table 6 ).
Interaction between sales drop and leverage
In this paragraph we explore the role of initial leverage in the transmission of the shock to sales adding interaction terms between SALESDROP 2009-12 and LEVERAGE. To facilitate the interpretation of coefficients we use a specification with dummy variables for each quartile of leverage and we estimated a linear probability model (LPM) instead of the logit model.
The results are reported in Table 7 an estimated increase in the default probability by less than 2 percentage points for the firms whose leverage falls in the bottom quartile.
Robustness
Even if we control for pre-crisis sales growth and the ratio of operating profits over total assets in 2008, we conducted further tests to ensure that we are not overstating the effect of leverage due to insufficient controls for firm performance before the crisis. High leverage could be the result of debt accumulation due to deteriorating performance before the first recession. To rule out this hypothesis we analyzed the characteristics of firms in the leverage quartiles before 2008. Table 8 shows the 2005-07 change in operating profits, sales and leverage by leverage quartile. The mean growth rate of operating profits is very similar across the four groups but firms that ended with higher leverage in 2008 experienced faster sales growth before the crisis, which suggests that they were expanding rather than underperforming. The increase in leverage also reflects structural differences since firms in the bottom quartile (low leverage) experienced the lowest growth of debt, while those in the top quartile were characterized by the highest growth. Since the aggregate statistics could be reflecting the behavior of specific industries, we Finally, we estimated the LPM model employing a wider definition of nonperforming that includes not only default but also situations in which the firm has past-due, restructured or substandard loans. Indeed, given the truncation of the data in 2012, we could be underestimating defaults because almost 17,000 firms exhibit repayment difficulties by 2012 but are not recorded as defaulted yet. The estimates, reported in Table 10 , confirm our previous findings both in terms of significance and magnitude of the coefficients.
Conclusions
Using a statistical model we estimated the effect of leverage on the probability that a firm defaults on its bank loans in a very large sample of Italian firms, mostly privately held. Our results show that the variable that better explains firm default during a period of economic contraction is the drop in sales. Controlling for the drop in sales, initial leverage has a substantial influence on the probability of default. The effect of leverage is twofold. It raises the default probability for any given drop in sales, but it also increases the sensitivity of the default probability to the shock to sales. Our findings support the conjecture that the degree of indebtedness of firms plays a role in financial stability because it amplifies the adverse impact of a real shock on firm solvency and, through this channel, on banks' health. We cannot provide evidence on the mechanism through which leverage and deteriorating performance interact with each other because this would require a structural model of firm insolvency, which is outside of the scope of this paper. Tables   Table 1   Sample 
Data Appendix
Balance sheet data are from the data base collected by Cerved Group on all limited liability companies and corporations. Default data are from the Central Credit Register. The sample was constructed from the set of firms that appear in the Cerved Group data in one or more years between 2003-2012. We kept firms for which non simplified balance sheets were publicly available, or those that provide information on financial debt. Very small firms are not required to compile a full balance sheet so for most of them we do not have information on financing. Table a1 almost two thirds of the observations refer to companies headquartered in the Northern regions. Almost 50 per cent of firms belong to Services (Table a2) . 
